To the Sound of the Guns: Canadians and Combat Surgery, 1938–1953 by Rawling, Bill
Canadian Military History
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 6
1-23-2012
To the Sound of the Guns: Canadians and Combat
Surgery, 1938–1953
Bill Rawling
Directorate of Heritage and History, Department of National Defence
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military
History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
Rawling, Bill (1997) "To the Sound of the Guns: Canadians and Combat Surgery, 1938–1953," Canadian Military History: Vol. 6: Iss.
1, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss1/6
To the Sound of the Guns 
Canadians and Coin bat Surgery, 
1938-1953 
Bill Rawling 
Combat surgery is almost as old as battle itself - the Iliad contains many an example of 
surgical intervention to heal wounds and in 
the modem era, the surgeon has become an 
almost saintly figure in the public imagination, 
especially in a context where human beings are 
actively engaged in killing one another. Myth is 
not far removed from fact, and there is no doubt 
as to the dedication of these men (women did 
not enter the field until very recently), but that 
still begs a few questions: how did they operate 
(in both the military and medical senses of the 
word) and how successful were they? This 
account traces the challenges Canadian 
surgeons faced in the Second World War and 
Korea as they sought solutions to problems 
medical (such as shock) and tactical (operating 
within range of enemy fire). It is, in effect, a 
story of civilians attempting to apply their 
knowledge under the severe stress of battle. 
* * * * * 
llThen Norman Bethune left Canada for China 
V V in 1938, he could not have gone further in 
time and space; for he did not travel to the China 
of Shanghai, or Peiping, or even Nanjing, but to 
the north-west, where little had changed in 
hundreds or even thousands of years. There, 
almost invisible to Europe and North America, 
pitched battles were being fought between armies 
of hundreds of thousands of troops as the 
communist Chinese and the Japanese Empire 
made war against each other. Bethune had 
already gained fame helping to organize blood 
transfusion units in Spain, and his ideological 
credentials were certainly in order, but the 
medical challenge that faced him as he made his 
way across China to join the 8th Route Army 
was immense. A formation of 200,000, with 
2500 in hospital at any given time, it had 
available only five doctors and 50 apprentices. 1 
The Canadian had his work cut out for him. 
Coming to grips with the role of the surgeon 
in modern war, in the last two months of 1938 
the Marxist doctor from Montreal carried out 
work which would have been familiar to his 
Huguenot and Scottish forebears. Referring to 
the prevalence of bone infection in certain 
wounds, he wrote: 
All osteomyelitis cases, involving the thigh, 
should have amputation as the quickest and 
most humane method of getting them out of 
hospital. It should be kept in mind, that, 
irrespective of whether or not these cases are 
treated conservatively or radically, that they will 
never be able to return to the front and their 
usefulness, as soldiers, is finished. We dislike 
as much as they, to be forced to amputate, but it 
is the most merciful procedure. At least we have 
saved their lives, even though they have only one 
leg, and in addition, have saved them months 
and possibly years of suffering which, even 
though they endure, will leave them with a leg 
which is not capable of bearing weight. In 
addition, to leave them in their present condition, 
with uncontrolled infection of the bone, is merely 
to await a slow death from chronic sepsis. So, 
all would point to amputation or nothing done. 2 
A surgeon of the Napoleonic Wars would have 
agreed. 
In another sphere, however, the Canadian 
attempted to innovate, and went about it in his 
usual bull-in-the-china-shop style. On 22 
November, he and his staff began operating on 
35 wounded soldiers who had spent three days 
in transit. Bethune reported that he berated the 
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Above left: Dr. Norman Bethune performs surgery in an unused Buddhist temple in central Hopei, China, 
Spring 1939. Above right: Bethune examines a young casualty of war in China, 1938. 
brigade commander, who "promised that on the 
next occasion of a planned action, that our 
Mobile Unit should be placed immediately 
behind the regiments in action, to render 
operative First Aid."3 A week later the situation 
had already improved, the Canadian gleefully 
noting that "We received our first patient at 5:15 
p.m.- seven hours and 15 minutes after he had 
been wounded. "4 In all, he and his team operated 
on 71 cases, of whom only one, suffering from 
near-hopeless wounds to the abdomen, 
succumbed. After further work of this nature, 
Bethune was much encouraged. "We have 
demonstrated to our own satisfaction and I hope 
to the satisfaction of the Army commanders the 
value of this type of treatment of wounds. It is 
expected that it will revolutionize our present 
concepts of the duties of the Sanitary Service. 
The time is past and gone in which doctors will 
wait for patients to come to them. Doctors must 
go to the wounded and the earlier the better. 
Every Brigade should have at its disposal such 
a Mobile Operating Unit such as ours. "5 Making 
a similar report to supporting committees in New 
York, Hong Kong, and London, the surgeon 
punctuated his argument with a compelling 
anecdote. 
58 
I will mention the two cases of perforation of the 
intestine by rifle bullets operated on. The first 
case was operated on 18 hours after wounded 
and the second 8 hours after being wounded. 
(NAC PA 114795 & PA 114786) 
Both cases had almost identical wounds - the 
bullet entering the abdomen at the level of the 
umbilicus. Both had ten perforations and tears 
of the small and large intestine with escape of 
intestinal contents into the abdominal cavity 
(including round worms!) Also there was in both 
cases a big hemmorrhage from tear of the 
mesenteric artery with the abdomen full of blood. 
Both were operated on at night in a dirty 
Buddhist temple by the light of candles and flash 
lights. The first case died the following day but 
the second made an uneventful recovery, in spite 
of being transported 60 li [roughly 30 kilometres 1 
every night for the following week on a rough 
stretcher. The difference between life and death 
was the difference between 8 hours and 18 
hours. 6 
It was, however, the recommendation of a 
lone Canadian working in the hinterland of the 
largest continent on earth, and when Bethune 
died on 12 November 1939 his ideas had not 
percolated beyond the Chinese army he worked 
with. They re-emerged independently two years 
later in a report by Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. 
MacFarlane, consulting surgeon to the Royal 
Canadian Army Medical Corps, who noted that 
"For some time the whole question of operating 
facilities in the forward area with motorised units 
has been under consideration. "7 Sweeping 
battles in Syria and East Africa had shown that 
Casualty Clearing Stations (somewhat rearwards 
in the casualty evacuation organization, behind 
stretcher-bearers, Regimental Aid Posts, 
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Advanced Dressing Stations, and Main Dressing 
Stations) were incapable of sufficient mobility 
to operate on a flowing battlefield, while Field 
Ambulance units, though well-mounted on a 
variety of vehicles and operating close to the 
front, lacked the necessary equipment for 
anything but the most rudimentary surgery. The 
solution was obvious: form a mobile operating 
unit, perhaps with sufficient dressings and 
supplies for 30 to 50 surgical operations, capable 
of being carried in a few trucks. Thus, in a rapid 
campaign, patients could be transported by 
ambulance to some form of forward operating 
post before being evacuated further to the rear. 
A colleague of MacFarlanes, a divisional 
Director of Medical Services, R.M. Luton, agreed 
with the need for such a unit in "a campaign of 
rapid movement," suggesting the army acquire 
specially constructed vehicles on 3-ton chassis. 
Other equipment would include a generator for 
keeping lights burning, a 60-gallon water tank, 
sufficient linen for 30 to 40 operations, and a 
15-hundredweight truck for carrying baggage, 
rations, and personnel. The surgeon and nursing 
sisters would travel in a station wagon. As for 
staff, he suggested a surgeon "who must have 
sound training and experience in all branches 
of traumatic surgery, preferably young, and must 
be of good physical condition. "8 Completing the 
team would be another surgeon with hospital 
experience in traumatic surgery, an anaesthetist, 
two nursing orderlies, and two nursing sisters, 
though the latter would only join a given unit at 
the discretion of the Corps' Deputy Director of 
Medical Services. The military hierarchy was 
uncomfortable with the possibility of women 
working close to the front. 
In the first days of 1942, therefore, it seemed 
that the creation of forward surgical units had 
been worked out in every detail, but the very 
concept of such an organization was still a 
subject for debate, and the proper location for a 
surgeon was not, in the eyes of some, near the 
fighting. One divisional Deputy Adjutant General, 
Beament by name, insisted that: 
In clearing a battle field, the first consideration 
is, as far as possible, to evacuate surgical cases 
to as far back a fixed hospital installation as 
possible. The theoretical ideal, therefore, would 
be if one could evacuate directly from collecting 
posts in the battle area to a general 
hospital. .. This desirable feature of making long 
evacuations to rear areas is in many surgical 
cases considerably aided by the development in 
medical science. I am now informed that in many 
cases of gunshot wounds it is now possible to 
pack the wounds with a sulphanilamide dresstng 
and the wounded man will keep without 
operative treatment and without danger of 
gangrene for about 48 hours. 9 
Beament thus concluded that surgeons would 
be needed in the rear, not in the battle zone, 
though there were still arguments for some form 
of forward surgery, if on a small scale. For" cases 
will undoubtedly occur, where early operative 
treatment would result in the eventual recovery 
of the soldier ... Further, it seems to me that it 
would be unfortunate, from the point of view of 
morale, if the idea were to become prevalent that 
surgical cases, who could not wait to reach a 
rearward installation, were abandoned to die." 
He therefore supported the creation of one 
surgery team per division. 
Thus by June 1942 the function and 
organization of such a unit was ready to move 
from theory to practice, MacFarlane describing 
its role as follows: "Mobile warfare has presented 
a new problem to the surgeon, he must put 
himself, his assistants and the essentials of 
equipment into vehicles which can move [as] 
quickly as the armoured division which he now 
serves. He must be prepared to set up his theatre 
in whatever shelter he can find, and do it quickly. 
He must be able to disband it rapidly and move 
forward to another area on short notice, and 
unfortunately sometimes he must be ready to 
move it rearwards out of enemy hands when the 
battle sways against his comrades. "10 The 
consulting surgeon to the Canadian Army 
concluded that "I am convinced that something 
of this sort is the answer to the problem of 
bringing early surgery to the wounded in this 
war." 
The result was the Field Surgical Unit, or 
FSU, though it would be more than a year before 
Canadian surgeons followed troops into battle. 
(Dieppe being designed as a raid, all casualties 
that did not fall into enemy hands were dealt 
with in hospitals in Britain.) In Operation Husky, 
the landings in Sicily of 10 July 1943, one 
practitioner reported how "John R. and I started 
operating about 24 hrs after landing- i.e. a filthy 
stable using the equipment that an English FSU 
had brought ashore in packs on their backs 
59 
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At a regimental aid post north of Ortona in early 1944, a wounded soldier, with multiple shrapnel 
wounds peppering his back, undergoes treatment at the hands of Corporal Quinton Carsell. Note 
the use of a hypodermic, which would not have been allowed in the hands of other than a nurse or 
doctor in the civilian world. (NAC PA 193909) 
we next worked in a wine cellar, then a house, a 
tent, a school, a cathedral and finally a school."11 
Their task was a reflection of war as a whole, 
cases arriving in batches so that "our work is 
anything but steady- periods of rush alternating 
with longer periods of idleness." Job satisfaction 
was ephemeral, surgeons having no opportunity 
to follow up on their cases after they were 
evacuated, "so cannot tell whether our work is 
good or bad." Their ability to deal with some 
traumas, however, was sadly clear; six abdominal 
wounds died out of 11 who reached their hands, 
as did five of 15 penetrating chest wounds. And, 
if they needed any reminding, infection still 
threatened to kill the patient of the most skilfull 
surgeon. 
Nos 1 and 2 FSUs supported Canadian 
ground forces in their advance across Sicily and, 
as the Germans completed their evacuation of 
the island, there was an opportunity to derive 
what lessons they could by those whose task it 
was to patch up the "accidents" of war. Between 
them, the two units performed 229 major 
surgical procedures. 
60 
The types of cases were mainly serious extremity 
wounds, abdominal cases, sucking wounds of 
chests, and bums. The fatal cases were for the 
most part abominal cases, sucking chest 
wounds, severe bums and cases of clinical gas 
gangrene. 24 Abdominal cases were operated on 
at an average of 7.7 hrs after being wounded. 
The mortality rate was 54%. Only 2 cases seen 
within 24 hrs of injury were refused operations 
because it was felt they could not survive any 
surgical procedure. The mortality in sucking 
wounds of the chest was 22% (5 deaths in 23 
cases). The mortality in wounds of extermitis 
[sic?] including bums was 11%. 12 
Most of the bum victims were undoubtedly tank 
crews, though the worst mortality rate was to 
gas gangrene, four of five patients who suffered 
from this First World War horror dying of its 
effects; penicillin use from 1943 on would prove 
only a partial remedy. 
As Bethune had noted four years earlier, 
competent surgery is not enough- the patient 
needs a high level of post-operative care if he is 
to survive. So, as the Canadians moved from 
Sicily to Italy and began making their slow, 
slogging way northwards, their medical units 
worked to get more of their services forward. An 
added incentive to performing some surgeries 
as close to the front as possible came with the 
creation of transfusion teams, small units that 
4
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usually set up shop near dressing stations. 
Through their ministrations, they saved the lives 
of many who would otherwise have died of shock 
brought on by blood loss, but to take advantage 
it was best that operations be performed before 
the patient was transported any great distance, 
bumping over the tracks of Italy often sending 
the patient into a relapse. Even after surgery, 
not all patients could be moved without serious 
risk, hence the need for forward nursing. 13 
According to G. W.L. Nicholson, "To be a nursing 
sister serving in a field surgical unit, close enough 
to the forward troops to be within range of the 
enemy's guns, was an envied role to which few 
nurses did not aspire."14 
By the time Canadian medical units still in 
Britain began their final preparations for the 
landings in Normandy, then, they had the 
benefits of lessons learned in Sicily and Italy. 
One of these was reflected in the fact that there 
were two FSUs per division instead of one. 
Another was seen in training, as John Burwell 
Hillsman later related in his autobiography, 
Eleven Men and a Scalpel. 
Our first consideration was to teach the men to 
erect the tent under varying conditions. We spent 
three weeks literally living in mud, putting up 
the tent and taking it down. The canvas was wet 
and heavy but we soon got to the point where we 
could set up in blackout conditions in twenty 
minutes and take down in fifteen ... 
At nights we practised night driving. Each man 
was given map references and required to find 
his way to various locations in the blackout by 
directing the driver what roads to take and what 
tums to make .. .I considered the men sufficiently 
trained in map reading when I noticed they 
invariably managed to get lost within a few 
hundred feet of a pub. 15 
As for more sophisticated training, "On the first 
of March, 1944, things began to look up. The 
invasion was obviously approaching. 
Headquarters ordered all seven of the Field 
Surgical Units along with two Field Transfusion 
Units into the field to be attached to a Field 
Dressing Station at Cranleigh. The next month 
was spent practising combined set ups with this 
Preparation for surgery begins while en route to a 
field surgical unit. Here, Private Nicky Deagle 
administers plasma to a casualty to prevent his 
sinking into shock. Ortona, Italy, 15 January 1944. 
(Photo by Alexander Stirton, NAC PA 144980) 
Unit and in combination with other Field 
Dressing Stations."16 
Hillsman and his team were put to work after 
the landings of 6 June, and their first operation 
can serve to demonstrate not only the surgical 
and other knowledge necessary for the task, but 
the leadership skills required as well. 
The time came for us to perform our first 
operation. The boys were standing by scrubbed 
and grtnning but it was obvious that they were a 
little nervous. I went into the Resuscitation Tent 
and had a talk with the Transfusion Officer. The 
tent was full of wounded but I chose a trivial 
wound of the arm for our first case. I didn't want 
to take on a big case until the men's nervousness 
had cleared a bit. The case was brought in. The 
arm was painted and the operation began. Soon 
we were through. As I put on the bandage I 
noticed the men were laughing and joking among 
themselves, proud as peacocks. I slipped into 
the Resuscitation Tent and chose an abdominal 
case. It went smoothly. From then on we took 
the cases as they came. By morning we were a 
weary, happy Unit - and I knew I had a team 
that could work with the best. 17 
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Regardless ojthe ruggedness of primitive conditions, 
aseptic surgery was still the rule, and all the 
necessary instruments were prepared for each case. 
(Photo by Alexander Stirton, NAC PA 196286) 
That he could rely on people in whom he had 
confidence was fortunate, as the doctor would 
face very difficult times in the months ahead. 
Two examples will suffice. The first occurred 
in the ten days leading up to the capture of Caen 
on 9 July, when Hillsman and his team "changed 
from mere soldiers to war-wise veterans," a 
process all medical personnel shared. 
62 
We saw the tragic sights from which we were 
never to be free for ten long months. Men with 
heads shattered and grey, dirty brains oozing out 
from the jagged margins of skull bones. 
Youngsters with holes in their chests fighting for 
air and breathing with a ghastly sucking noise. 
Soldiers with intestines draining feces into their 
belly walls and with their guts chumed into a 
bloody mess by high explosives. Legs that were 
dead and stinking- but still wore a muddy shoe. 
Operating floors that had to be scrubbed with 
lysol to rid the Theatre of the stench of dead 
flesh. Red blood that flowed and spilled over 
while life held on by the slender thread of time. 
Boys who came to you with a smile and died on 
the operating table. Boys who lived long enough 
for you to leam their name and then were carried 
away in trucks piled high with the dead. We 
leamed to work with heavy guns rocking and 
blasting the thin walls of our tent. We learned to 
keep our tent ropes slack so that anti-aircraft 
fragments would rain down harmlessly and 
bounce off the canvas. We became the possessors 
of bitter knowledge that no man has ever been 
able to describe. Only by going through it do you 
possess it. 18 
If at times it was the constant grind of fighting 
off death that took its toll, on other occasions it 
could be an individual patient that reminded the 
surgeon of the limits of modem medical science. 
Hillsman particularly remembered one difficult 
case of internal bleeding. 
The anaesthetist bent over him. I put on my 
gown. The painting and draping were quickly 
done. I looked at the anaesthetist. He nodded. A 
quick incision ... Furious hemorrhage .. .I can't see! 
He's bleeding too fast ... Suction, quick! ... Still 
can't see ... A pack! Press hard! ... It's still 
flowing ... Big forceps, quick! ... I'll have to clamp 
blind ... Oh God, I hope I get it .. .It's no use. It 
won't work ... To the main vessel quick. .. Another 
incision ... Rapid dissection ... The vessel is 
tied ... Back again to the first incision. It's slowed 
up but not stopped ... Suction! Pack! Sponge! 
Quick! .. .I straightened up ... A sigh of relief. It's 
stopped. A quiet voice as from the distance, ''I'm 
afraid he's gone. "19 
With a fatality rate approaching 20 per cent, the 
anaesthetist's words were often to be repeated. 
Though the FSUs were made up of 
experienced personnel, the Normandy campaign 
could still offer much that was novel - if 
On occasion, however, other tools were put to use, 
such as the spoon in this case. Italy, January 1944. 
(Photo by Alexander Stirton, NAC PA 196285) 
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gruesome. One characteristic of Operation 
Overlord was the reliance on tactical air power, 
including the use of heavy bombers to support 
the advance by pounding German defensive 
positions. The technique was, however, risky, 
and on two occasions in August four-engined 
aircraft unleashed their loads on their own 
troops, what Hillsman described as "our two 
worst surgical experiences." Being close to the 
front line, as they were supposed to be, he and 
his team found every bed and stretcher filled 
within an hour of the bombs having dropped, 
with two hundred wounded lying on the ground 
outside the operating tent waiting for help. "The 
worst feature of these cases was the "blast" lungs. 
I lost ten patients in a row on the operating table 
and of twenty cases done in two operating 
sessions sixteen died within twenty-four hours. 
The mortality was so high one capable young 
surgeon became so depressed that he asked for 
a transfer back to a Base Hospital. "20 
The Normandy Campaign, costing the lives 
of over 5000 Canadian soldiers, was Canada's 
bloodiest battle of the Second World War, which 
accounts for the experiences detailed above, and 
when the front broke in the last days of August, 
medical personnel found themselves busier than 
ever. As Hillsman later related, "The situation 
was difficult. We were the only Surgical Unit open 
to cover the Army moving forward. We had to 
handle all the casualties for at least twenty-four 
hours. I had no relief surgical team and no 
Transfusion Unit with me. We hadn't any blood 
or penicillin for the wounded. What's worse we 
hadn't an icebox to keep the blood in and it would 
only last twelve hours in the heat ... We set up the 
canvas and just as we started to sterilize the 
instruments the first ambulance rolled in. For 
thirty-six hours we operated continuously 
without sleep or rest." When it was all over, "I 
slept like a drunken man. "21 
As the army moved forward, surgical teams 
fell farther and farther behind, ammunition, 
food, and fuel being top priorities, forcing 
medical units to stay off the roads. "Fortunately 
the casualties were light but those we were getting 
were in bad shape and a few arrived dead who 
should never have died at all, "22 Hillsman 
complained, but commanders thought they 
would lose fewer lives by rushing up combat 
supplies and troops to bring the war to an early 
conclusion than they would through delayed 
medical attention. As we well know, the gamble 
failed to pay off, and the war went on for nine 
more months, but the military leadership did 
not know that at the time. As for the doctors 
and their staffs, having been formed into units 
designed to perform operations as quickly as 
possible, they had to carry out their work in the 
knowledge that many of their patients had come 
a long way- and already begun their journey to 
death- before making it to the operating table. 
Meanwhile, as September neared its end, 
medical units began to ponder the lessons of the 
Normandy campaign, and submitted reports to 
enlighten their superiors. Discussion over the 
proper location of Field Surgical Units continued, 
though the consensus from the FSUs themselves 
was that they should co-locate with Field 
Dressing Stations-just behind the front- rather 
than with Casualty Clearing Stations further 
back. Proximity to the fighting was not the only 
consideration in arriving at such a conclusion, 
it having been found that a CCS, with its varied 
responsibilities of sorting, transporting, and 
accommodating patients, was not able to handle 
the number of cases emerging from an FSU 
during peak periods, while the FDS could 
allocate all its resources to exactly that task. 23 
One correspondent went so far as to suggest that 
"FSUs and CCSs are incompatable [sic]."24 
Of course, practitioners also argued that they 
had to be close to the front because time was of 
the essence, though by the end of the Normandy 
campaign some were more specific, one FSU 
suggesting six hours, or 10 to 15 miles from the 
scene of injury, should be taken as maximums. 25 
Another unit noted a paradox, the mortality rate 
among chest cases increasing when it operated 
far forward, though the reason why was clear; 
when located further back, it saw very few such 
wounds as victims died before they could make 
it to surgery.26 As for abdominals, these patients 
had to be resuscitated immediately, often 
requiring two to four bottles of blood and 
plasma, and then operated upon as soon as they 
were stable. "Delay," one FSU reported, "is only 
asking for a fatal result. "27 As we have seen, the 
death rate was already high enough, about ten 
per cent within 24 hours, half of them from 
shock, according to studies done in Italy at this 
time. 28 
63 
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In both the Mediterranean and north-west 
Europe, doctors agreed that competent surgery 
was not enough, and continued to insist on the 
effectiveness of forward post-operative care, 
preferably by nursing sisters whose training was 
near-perfect for the task. A report from the Italian 
theatre pointed out the problem in great detail, 
especially as it related to abdominal cases. 
Most officers on post operative wards find their 
hands full juggling with gastric suctions. 
aspirating chests and in attending to the general 
needs of their patients. During the night except 
in cases of real emergency no medical officer is 
on the wards. Even during the day time patients 
just returned from the OR are left to themselves 
to come out of the anaesthetic. Blood pressures 
are rarely taken and unless the patient is in 
extremis no particular attention is paid to him. 
It may be that if the same careful observation of 
pulse, blood pressure etc were made as in the 
post operative ward and the same energetic type 
of rescuscitation were carried out that a 
considerable number of serious or potentially 
serious cases might be saved from a rapid decline 
and death. This raises the question when does 
resuscitation cease? When the patient goes to 
OR? at the end of operation? - or when the 
patient is safely past any danger of post operative 
collapse? 
Careful observation combined with active 
methods of resuscitation during the 6-12 hours 
immediately following operation would seem to 
be the means by which these high mortality 
figures can most readily be reduced. If this proves 
true it is not unlikely that some will be saved 
from "Shock" to die of other causes. 29 
An FSU in Normandy added that "Good nursing 
is essential and rates in importance with 
resuscitation and the operation. Under the 
supervision of nursing sisters this care is 
certainly improved. "30 
While commanders and policy makers sorted 
out the lessons of mid-1944, the war marched 
on and casualties continued to mount. Even four 
months after arriving in north-west Europe, 
Hillsman still found some injuries shocking. 
"Tank wounds were horrible things to treat. They 
are always accompanied by more or less severe 
burns and are multiple in nature. The wounds 
are not usually from shell fragments but one digs 
out pieces of armour plate and large lumps of 
hard rubber and nuts and bolts. "31 It was, 
As with pre-op, so with post-op, blood was administered whenever 
it was deemed necessary, creating a heavy demand. 
(NAC PA 196287) 
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Nursing sisters. because oj their in-depth training in civilian life. were 
deemed crucial at all stages qf the surgical process. Here, Lieutenant 
Nursing Sister Lillian White turns a school into a surgical centre. 
however. the pace of operations that took the 
worst toll on surgical staff. and the symptoms of 
stress slowly became acute. "One man started 
fainting at the sight of blood. I had to send him 
back. Another got quite surly and unco-
operative. He was one of my best men and I tried 
to reason with him without too much success. I 
kept him. hoping he would straighten out. A third 
youngster began to talk and laugh with a hint of 
hysteria. The Corporal reported he had heard 
him sobbing in his sleep several times. He would 
have to be watched carefully.":12 The surly staff 
member eventually had to be returned to 
England, though the young soldier showing signs 
of hysteria begged for a second chance and served 
with the unit until the end of the war. 
Medics in north-west Europe. therefore, 
must have been thankful for a lull in the 
(NAC PA 196288) 
campaigning that began in the first days of 
November. so that by the end of 1944 one FSU 
could report that it was "A fairly dull 3 months 
from the surgical standpoint "33 As the Christmas 
season set soldiers' minds to home and happier 
times, surgical operations fell into a routine of 
treating injuries and dealing with wounds 
resulting from raids, firefights, shelling, and 
Hitler's weapons of revenge, the infamous V1s 
and V2s. At a different level, "'Considerable 
controversy still goes on over the siting of 
FSUs,"34 though as we have seen the units 
themselves had been insisting for some time that 
they had to be as far forward as possible. They 
had allies, 21 Field Dressing Station, for 
example. voiced dissatisfaction with its dual role 
as an advanced dressing station and recovery 
centre, the staff of the former unable to take good 
care of patients in the latter during busy periods. 
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Instead, it suggested it act as an Advanced 
Surgical Centre, with surgical teams and 
transfusion units attached. "This would push 
surgery and resuscitation farther forward. This 
is considered necessary. "35 
In arguing to be allowed to operate closer to 
the front, surgeons and their supporters were 
no doubt thinking of their most difficult cases -
the fatality rate still hovering around 20 per cent. 
As the Allies crossed the Rhine on 23-24 March, 
Hillsman noted that his unit had treated its 
1000th patient; though a milestone, the now-
experienced surgeon saw no cause for 
celebration. "It was appalling to think that nearly 
two hundred men had died under my knife in 
the last nine months,"36 and there was little 
possibility of improvement. After First Canadian 
Army fought its way through the Rhineland in 
February and March, Major G.F. Penna! of the 
3rd Casualty Clearing Section calculated that a 
third of those suffering from combined chest and 
abdominal wounds died oftheir injuries, partly 
the result of post-operative complications due 
to respiratory infection on admission or 
exhaustion from prolonged fighting. 37 
Number 3 Field Surgical Unit's experiences 
were similar as it reported a fatality rate of 19 
per cent for wounds to the abdomen, accounting 
for almost all of the 6 per cent who died of 116 
major operations carried out from January to 
March. It also noted how combat surgery was a 
continuing leaming experience. 
During the past quarter we have felt, more than 
ever before, how specialized our role as forward 
surgeons had become. Almost unconsciously we 
find ourselves thinking more and more of the 
wound itself- the type of missile, it's course and 
what it would hit or miss - the surgery itself 
being almost automatic and simple. It is 
surprising to fmd how accurate one may be and 
how canny one's decision in the thoraco-
abdominal or glueto-abdominal wound, and yet 
there are surprises at every tum and one's best 
armament is an open mind. It is, in fact, the 
only way to remain sane!38 
Another was to focus not on those who died, but 
on the majority who lived, 5 FSU reporting an 
abdominal fatality rate of 18.3 per cent, but 
suggesting that "Even if 5% died after leaving us 
the results are still good."39 In the first three 
months of 1945, 162 cases survived out of 198, 
so that Major R.B. Eaton, the unit's commander 
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and chief surgeon, could report that "On the 
whole it has been most gratifying." 
A positive attitude was perhaps the best 
armour for what was to come, the Canadians 
having been given the task of liberating the 
Netherlands, keeping them in battle from the end 
of March to the first days of May. Number 10 
FSU reported that "April has been the Unit's 
record month,"40 it having to move six times, 
mainly in pursuit of 4th Canadian Amoured 
Division. "All of our cases ranked high in priority, 
the bulk of them resulting from the battles of 
the Kusten Canal area. Ambulances carrying 
both incoming and evacuated casualties were 
obliged to negotiate extremely difficult road 
conditions- delays were inevitable. The severity 
of the wounding was the greatest we have yet 
encountered and exceeded that of our experience 
at Bedburg," where the unit had served during 
the peak days of the Rhineland campaign, in late 
February and early March. "As a comparison of 
volume- at Bedburg the Unit operated on a total 
of 42 cases in 22 days, of these 27 were 
abdominals or thoraco-abdominals; at 
Friesoythe the Unit operated on a total of 49 
cases in 11 days, 29 of the cases being abdominal 
or thoraco-abdominal. There were 15 deaths 
during the month, the majority of these had 
sustained a degree of trauma precluding 
survival. "41 Working conditions were as poor as 
the war-ravaged country the unit moved through. 
buildings having no glass in their windows; as a 
result rapid resuscitation was difficult and some 
operations were long delayed. To aggravate 
matters, liquid plasma was not available and the 
use of dry plasma- a very recent development-
led to numerous negative reactions. The German 
surrender of 4 May must surely have come as a 
relief. 
The end of the war in Europe was not, 
however, the end of our story; for though 
Canadian surgical units did not serve in Asia 
against the Japanese, they did make their way 
to Korea after war broke out there in 1950. 
Canadian troops began arriving in early 1951, 
though at first any forward surgery they required 
was done by American or Norwegian specialists 
at the now-famous Mobile Army Surgical 
Hospitals. Then, With as little delay as possible, 
they were funnelled into Canadian channels, 
including a Canadian Section at the British 
Commonwealth Hospital in Kure, Japan.42 Later, 
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A casualty being evacuated by helicopter in Korea. The helicopter helped to 
revolutionize medical care by decreasing the time between wounding and treatment. 
Number 25 Canadian Field Surgical Team (FST) 
made its way to the theatre, operating with the 
8055th MASH in mid-1952, then transferring 
to the 25th Advanced Dressing Station. 43 
Completely set up and running by 25 August, 
the team was ready to receive patients from 
Commonwealth field ambulances as well as from 
the 8055th and Norwegian MASHs. "As X-ray 
facilities were still not available at this unit any 
casualties sent here were generally first sent to 
either the American MASH or Norwegian MASH 
where X-rays were taken and debridement 
[removal of dead tissue] carried out. At times 
some of these casualties were evacuated to the 
FST for their initial surgery. However, as 
intended, the prime function of this unit 
continued to be elective surgery and delayed 
primary suturing to avoid evacuation to Japan. 
By this means it was possible to return the 
soldier to his unit much sooner."44 Priorities were 
thus the same as they had been since the early 
days of combat medicine; above all else the 
surgeon's duty was to get as many wounded men 
as possible back into the fighting. 
(NAC PA 196754) 
A cease-fire went into effect in Korea in mid-
1953, allowing practitioners to ponder what 
difference their work had made. In the Boer War, 
the British had lost 93 of every 1000 men 
wounded, and in the First World War the 
Canadians saw 114 per 1000 die after initial 
treatment. In the Second World War that figure 
dropped to 66, and then dropped again to 34 in 
the course of the conflict in Korea. Surgery, 
however, did not explain the improvement from 
one mid-century war to another, as "Surgical 
practices in the management of wounds were 
much as they were in 1945."45 Rather, other 
factors, such as helicopter evacuation, armoured 
vests, and antibiotics helped give the wounded 
soldier a better chance of survival. (One should 
not, however, exaggerate the impact of the 
helicopter. From July 1951 to February 1952 
only 31 Canadians were evacuated this way.)46 
Certain techniques aside, in the popular 
imagination the MASH units of Korea were the 
epitome of combat surgery, but as we have seen 
they were in fact examples of an organization 
that had been in place since the late 1930s. With 
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the formation of FSUs and their despatch to 
Sicily, Canadians admitted that evacuation 
methods had reached their peak of efficiency, 
and if soldiers were to be better served by 
military surgeons, the latter would have to move 
closer to their patients. Surgeons, though non-
combatants, had nonetheless to move to the 
sound of the guns. 
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